2 Some commentators believe that government regulation of investment company authority is an inappropriate response to potential conflicts of interest in the industry. See infra note 32. This comment does not address the theoretical appropriateness of such governmental regulation but explores the problem of excessive fees within the context of the existing statutory framework.
3 See infra notes 12-38 and accompanying text. 4 In relevant part, § 36(b) provides : For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered company on behalf of such company. .... With respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments. . .shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances. (3). . .No award of damages shall be recoverable for any period prior to one year section 36(b) of the ICA to recover the excess fees and to restore them to the corporate treasury. 10 Since the procedural requirements of section 36(b) shareholder suits are not specified by statute, a debate has arisen in the federal courts as to whether a section 36(b) shareholder plaintiff must comply with the demand requirement of rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" prior to commencing suit. Rule 23.1 requires shareholder plaintiffs either to make demand on the board of directors of the corporation before commencing a derivative action in an attempt to obtain the remedy they desire or to give an excuse for the failure to make demand. Plaintiffs in section 36(b) actions have advanced two arguments against requiring demand: first, that section 36(b) shareholder suits are not derivative actions; and second, that even if section 36(b) actions are derivative, demand under rule 23.1 would inevitably be futile and should therefoie be automatically excused.
This comment will review the structure and purposes of the ICA, particularly section 36(b), discuss the federal cases that have considered the issue of demand in section 36(b) cases, and evaluate the arguments regarding the derivative nature of the section 36(b) suit and the propriety of demand in such suits. It concludes that the language and legislative history of section 36(b) are most easily read as making the shareholder cause of action under that section derivative of an implied cause of action accruing to the directors of the fund. Finding that demand furthers the policy of section 36(b), streamlines derivative suits, and increases opportunities to settle section 36(b) suits without burdening plaintiff shareholders, the comment also concludes that demand should be required in all section 36(b) suits.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. History of the ICA Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 in response to concern over "the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies." " Mutual funds and other investment companies are characterized by a "unique"' s manage-ment structure; although the funds are nominally independent and supervised by their own boards of directors, they are sponsored and managed by a separate company that acts as the funds' investment adviser.
14 An investment adviser's control over the fund typically includes organizing and promoting the fund, managing the fund's portfolio, 15 supervising the business operations of the fund, and even selecting the fund's directors, some of whom may also be directors or officers of the investment adviser. 16 The extensive control over the fund wielded by the adviser is a matter of necessity, for the fund's directors usually do not possess the expertise needed to manage the fund. The directors' dependence on the adviser is problematic. The directors are often reluctant to terminate an advisory contract for fear of the fund's being left at risk without an adviser. " [T] he forces of arm's-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy,"' 7 and, as a result, "[tihe relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts of interest."" When it enacted the ICA' 9 in 1940, Congress sought to prevent abuse of the investment company structure 2 0 by requiring that at 14 Id. at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4901; see also SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 8; Case Comment, supra note 1, at 601-02.
"The portfolio is usually the fund's only asset. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. " 725 . Among the abuses leading to the enactment of the ICA were "discriminatory transactions that favored least forty percent of the directors of an investment company be "unaffiliated" with the adviser. 2 1 The ICA also mandated that the "unaffiliated" directors approve the advisory fee contract between the fund and the adviser. 2 2 The adoption of the ICA successfully eliminated the "flagrantly dishonest practices" which had plagued the industry.
3
By the mid-1960's, however, the growth of the investment industry had created new problems. 24 The unaffiliated directors appeared unable to prevent excessive advisory fees, 25 1976) ). "Unaffiliated" was defined to exclude officers, directors, employees, or owners of more than five percent of the voting securities of the adviser from the position of director of the investment company. See id. § 2(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976)). 22 Id. § 15(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1976)). Additionally, the 1940 ICA required that the fund disclose certain information, such as investment strategies, to its shareholders, id. at § 8(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1976)) and that directors reapprove yearly any contract in effect for more than two years. Id. § 15(a)(2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2)). The SEC was given the power to enforce the Act. Id. § 36 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976)). 22 23 The 1966 SEC Report, which paved the way for the 1970 amendments to the ICA, concluded that the existing restraints on investment advisers' compensation were inadequate. This inadequacy resulted primarily from the lack of bargaining power on the part of the investment fund's independent directors vis-a-vis the investment adviser. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 131. Independent directors selected by the investment advisers are likely to be "friendly" directors who will not "rock the boat." See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 723. The independent directors usually have limited time for director duties, have no staff, and no external counsel, so they obtain most of their information about fund operations from the adviser. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 130-31; Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 220-22 (1971). In most cases, the directors have no feasible alternative to acceptance of the advisory contract, since rejection of the contract or termination of an existing contract leaves the fund without an adviser and at a serious risk. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 129, 131. There is also little possibility of shareholder-initiated opposition to the management of an investment fund, since shareholders are usually highly dispersed, with no one shareholder owning a large number of shares. Id. at 129-30. Thus:
The possibility of disrupting the fund's operations, the prospect of a bitter and expensive proxy contest, and the risk and uncertainty involved in replacing the entire fund management organization with a new and untested one, make termination of the existing advisory relationship a wholly unrealistic alternative in negotiations over advi-shareholders seeking to attack the fees in court were consistently defeated by the existing ICA standard that required them to prove that payment of the fees amounted to "corporate waste." 2 6 In an attempt to control excessive advisory fees, Congress amended the ICA in 1970. Two principal changes pertinent to the demand requirement were made.
7 First, Congress required that at least forty percent of an investment fund's directors be "disinterested," 8 rather than merely "unaffiliated." 2 9 The disinterested directors were installed as "independent watchdogs" 3 0 "to supply an independent check on management and to provide a means for the representation of shareholder interests in investment company sory fees. Without such an alternative, advisory fees negotiated between advisers and the unaffiliated directors lack the essential element of arm's-length transactions and provide inadequate assurance that the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the price at which similar services could be obtained in a genuinely competitive market. affairs." 31 Second, section 36(b) was enacted to deal specifically with the problem of excessive advisory fees.
3 2 Section 36(b) expressly provides that the investment adviser owes a fiduciary duty to the investment company with respect to its own compensation. 3 Congress was convinced that the "corporate waste" standard for judging advisory fees was "unduly restrictive. ' 34 Congress also strengthened the directors' position by requiring that approval by the fund's directors of the compensation paid to the investment adviser "shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances. Director termination refers to the action of a court dismissing a derivative suit if, acting upon a shareholder's demand, the board of directors exercises its good-faith business judgment and refuses to sue or actively opposes the suit. Case Comment, supra note 1, at 604 n.18; see infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text. Although not necessary to the holding of Burks, the court's dicta have been accepted as a "strong signal," which "prudence" dictates must be obeyed. * . . performs precisely this function for derivative suits charging breach of fiduciary duty with respect to adviser's fees.""" Shareholder plaintiffs since Burks have therefore challenged the derivative nature of section 36(b) suits and asserted that, even if section 36(b) suits are derivative, the Burks "no-termination" rule renders futile any demand on the board of directors to pursue the suit. 45 The Second Circuit has agreed with the shareholder plaintiffs. The other two circuits that have ruled on the question of demand have, however, disagreed with the shareholder plaintiffs, and required demand.
In ' The court noted that there is no express authorization of a cause of action for the investment company in the language of section 36(b),' 48 and argued that the "on behalf of" language in 36(b) did not imply a normal shareholder derivative action, but merely signified that the excess fees must be returned to the investment fund's treasury. 49 The Second Circuit concluded that "[s]ince directors cannot cut off a suit and § 36(b) does not authorize them to institute one, and because shareholder plaintiffs are necessarily challenging fees the directors evaluated and approved, . . . the traditional reason for the demand requirement simply does not apply." 5 0 A demand requirement in a section 36(b) action "would be an empty, unfruitful and dilatory exercise. ' ment Fund, Inc., 53 however, the First and Third Circuits held that the shareholder action provided for in section 36(b) was a derivative action." Both courts concluded on several grounds that the rule 23.1 demand requirement was entirely consistent with the section 36(b) statutory scheme. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presumptively apply to all cases brought under federal statutes unless Congress instructs otherwise. 5 5 Second, even assuming that Burks was correct, and that the independent directors of the mutual fund cannot terminate the section 36(b) suit, demand would not necessarily be futile; if demand is required, the directors will still have an opportunity to study and remedy the advisory fee problem." Third, requiring demand furthers the purposes of the ICA by strengthening the independent management of investment funds by the independent directors. 57 Resolution of the demand issue has "important ramifications for suits brought pursuant to § 36(b)." 58 At stake is the authority of the board of directors to handle issues involving investment company advisory compensation, the ease with which a section 36(b) action may be brought and prosecuted by shareholders, and the efficient resolution of a section 36(b) action. As Grossman, Weiss, and Fox indicate, the crucial questions in the demand issue are whether a section 36(b) suit is derivative and whether, if it is, demand is more than a futile exercise. The remainder of this comment analyzes these two questions.
II. THE DERIVATIVE NATURE OF SECTION 36(b) ACTIONS
The rule 23.1 demand requirement applies only to derivative suits brought by shareholders to enforce corporate rights. Section 53 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982). " The court in Grossman held that the statute provided a direct cause of action for an investment company, because the language "on behalf of" normally implies "a derivative action that the company could itself bring." 674 F.2d at 120. The court in Weiss, although not disagreeing with the Grossman rationale, went on to hold that the § 36(b) shareholder suit was derivative because a cause of action for the company can be inferred from the statute. 692 F.2d at 934. In Weiss, the court relied on the test announced in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which looks primarily to legislative history to determine the propriety of implied causes of action, and found that the legislative history of § 36(b) suggested no intent to deprive the company of a direct remedy. 692 F.2d at 935. For a more detailed discussion of the implied cause of action in § 36(b), see infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. 
36(b)
gives an express cause of action to "shareholders" of an investment company "on behalf of such company," but no express cause of action to the company itself. It is unclear whether investment companies have an implied cause of action under section 36(b). It is also unclear whether the explicit section 36(b) cause of action is a derivative one based on the rights of the investment company or an independent one granted directly to shareholders.
A. The Investment Company's Implied Cause of Action
The rule 23.1 demand requirement "applies only when a corporation or association has 'failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it.' -6o The investment company itself has no express cause of action under section 36(b); the language of the section only provides actions for the SEC and for shareholders."' A cause of action for the investment company may, however, be implied by section 36(b).
"The central inquiry" in determining whether to infer a private cause of action requires asking "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or impliedly, a private cause of action.
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified .... The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority, and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.. . . The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs. 66 (1975) , as relevant to the inquiry into whether an implied right of action exists, which include the status of the plaintiff as a special beneficiary of the statute, the legislative intent, the applicability of private remedies within the statutory context, and the remedies available through state law, are still relevant to that inquiry insofar Private rights of action are not to be lightly inferred, because unintended private enforcement may create a remedy "that is significantly broader than the remedy that Congress chose to provide," 6 3 thereby disturbing a balance of interests set by Congress. 6 Inferring a private cause of action for the investment company under section 36(b) does not disturb Congress's remedial plan. Section 36(b) was not designed to be exclusively enforced by the government; the statute authorizes private actions by shareholders. 5 Because private actions by the company itself and private actions by the shareholders both result in the return of excess fees to the company treasury, 6 and both utilize the same enforcement mechanism, a suit against the investment advisors, 6 7 an implied cause of action for the company would have little effect on the remedial balance established by Congress in section 36(b). 8 Under the 1940 ICA, courts consistently found an implied cause of action whereby an investment company could recover excessive compensation under section 36.69 The legislative history of the 1970 ICA amendments indicates no congressional dissatisfaction with the prevailing judicial finding of a private cause of action.70 Since Congress clearly intended private enforcement to occur and, at least tacitly approved, because it did not eliminate, the existing implied cause of action for the investment company, a private cause of action for investment companies should continue to as they help determine congressional intent. Even after one has concluded that the investment company has an implied cause of action under section 36(b), the question still remains whether the express cause of action granted to shareholders by section 36(b) is derivative of, or independent from, the corporation's cause of action. The inquiry begins with the language of the statute which refers to a shareholder's right to sue "on behalf of such company. ' 7 2 In corporation law, a shareholder suit "on behalf of such company" usually refers to a derivative suit that the company itself could bring. 73 Although the "on behalf of" language (1976) , both provide that, in certain situations, shareholders may sue "in the name and on the behalf of" their company to recover profits from the purchase and sale of securities by interested persons. These actions are clearly derivative. One might argue that Congress left the "in the name of" language out of § 36(b) because it intended to create an independent shareholder action. Yet, given the uniform use of the "on behalf of" terminology to refer to derivative suits, the omission of the accessory clause is not determinative of the section's meaning.
Most states also have statutes establishing procedures for shareholder derivative suits. Although most of these statutes provide that a derivative action shall be brought "in the right of" the corporation to procure a judgment for the corporation, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 626 (McKinney 1963), some statutes also use the "on behalf of" language. New York provides that "[i]f the action on behalf of the corporation" is successful, the plaintiff can recover attorney's fees. Id. § 626(e) (emphasis added). California provides that if there is a strong prima facie case in favor of a "claim asserted on behalf of the corporation," a plaintiff need not allege that he was a shareholder at the time of the transaction complained of. can be read as an effort to appoint shareholders as "private attorneys general" to help enforce section 36(b) for the benefit of the investment companies, 4 there is nothing in the legislative history of 36(b) to support such a reading. Absent any special rationale identified by Congress, courts should give to the term "on behalf of" its usual interpretation. 5 Apart from the language of the statute, a section 36(b) shareholder suit has all the characteristics of a derivative suit. Typically, derivative suits are based on the rights of the corporation," seek to redress injuries to the corporation," and direct all recovery to the corporation's treasury and not to the individual shareholders.
7 8 Section 36(b) suits share all of these characteristics. First, in section 36(b) suits, the fiduciary duty imposed on the adviser is owed to the company and is not a right of the individual shareholders. 79 . 1980) 7' "An action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name, but must be brought in the name of the corporation [derivatively] ." That the shareholder suffers a decline in assets is "insufficient direct harm to give the shareholder standing to sue in his own right. payment of excessive fees to the investment adviser injures the investment company as a whole and not only the shareholders as individuals. 80 Third, any recovery in a section 36(b) suit reverts to the investment fund, not to the shareholder plaintiff. 8 1
The "contemporary legal context" 8 2 and the legislative history of the 1970 ICA amendments both indicate that the section 36(b) shareholder action was intended to be derivative. First, the fact that Congress did not expressly grant a private cause of action to the company, and thus expressly create a shareholder derivative suit, 8 3 despite the derivative characteristics of section 36(b) shareholder suits, may stem less from a congressional intent to restrict derivative suits than from the legal realities at the time the statute was drafted. At the time of the 1970 ICA amendments, all suits challenging excessive advisory fees had been brought by shareholders.
8 4 Congress may have used the language "on behalf of" expecting that shareholders alone would bring section 36(b) suits. Such an expectation would have corresponded to the typical form of prior suits, but it does not necessarily deprive the shareholder suit of its derivative character, or of the procedures attendant upon derivative suits, such as demand.
Second, prior to the 1970 amendments, section 36(b) shareholder suits against investment advisers for excessive fees were CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4898 (investment adviser has a fiduciary duty "with respect to mutual fund shareholders"). Even before the ICA amendments, there existed some case law holding that the investment adviser was "a fiduciary of the fund he advises. strictly derivative, 5 since they were based on the corporation's right to recovery for "corporate waste." ' The legislative history of the 1970 ICA amendments indicates that the purpose of the new section 36(b) was to "ameliorate the 'unduly restrictive' standard of 'corporate waste' which shareholders had been required to prove in implied derivative actions for excessive fees under the original § 36.1187 Congressional concern focused extensively on the fiduciary duty of the advisers and the standards by which advisers' fees were to be judged without once focusing on the derivative nature of the pre-section 36(b) actions.
8 8 The clear implication is that in enacting the 1970 ICA amendments Congress did not disapprove of the form of the remedy (a shareholder derivative suit), but merely sought to change the standard of care from "corporate waste" to "fiduciary duty". 8 9 Since Congress gave no indication that section 36(b) shareholder actions were not intended to be derivative, Congress can be presumed to have incorporated the derivative nature of the pre-1970 shareholder suits into the section 36(b) action. 9 The section 36(b) shareholder action is therefore derivative. The investment company has an implied cause of action under section 36(b), and the language, characteristics, and legislative history of the section 36(b) shareholder action indicate a congressional intent that that action be derivative. IN SECTION 36(b) ACTIONS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 instructs shareholders that prior to bringing any derivative action they must either make a demand on the board of directors of the corporation in an attempt "to obtain the action [they] desire from the directors" or give an excuse for failure to make this demand. 9 1 Plaintiffs in section 36(b) actions argue that even if the section 36(b) suit is a derivative one, the rule 23.1 demand requirement is inconsistent with the legislative purposes and policy underlying section 36(b). Therefore, they argue, the demand requirement should be automatically excused in section 36(b) actions as a conclusive presumption of law. 2 These arguments are ultimately unpersuasive. The importance of conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the legislative history and purposes behind the adoption of section 36(b), namely, the strengthening of independent directors and the need for efficiency in the disposition, including settlement, of section 36(b) suits, all lead to the conclusion that demand should be required. FRCP" as a safeguard against frivolous or harassing lawsuits. 9 The presumption that rule 23.1 applies to "any civil suit brought in a federal district court" 17 is not contested by any statement in the legislative history of section 36(b) and therefore should apply to suits under that statute.
III. THE FUNCTIONS OF DEMAND
In general, the rule 23.1 demand requirement for derivative suits is adhered to strictly. 98 While the trial court does have the discretion to excuse demand, such excuse will be granted only on a strict showing of "futility." 9' Demand will be excused only if it is clear from the circumstances "that the demand upon the directors would meet rejection by them." 100 a) (1976) , even though that section provided that, in bringing an action, the United States Attorney General should set "forth facts pertaining to such pattern or practice" of discrimination. The court held that it would follow rule 8(a) since Congress had not clearly indicated that the rule was to be preempted.
any chance that the directors may take remedial action in response to the shareholders' complaint." ' 011 Certain factual patterns have been held to support an allegation that the directors are unable to consider demand objectively. 102 First, demand may be excused as futile where the directors are actually controlled by the alleged wrongdoers.' 0 3 Second, a conflict of interest on the part of the directors with respect to the transaction at issue will excuse demand, but only if the facts indicate that the interests of the directors are clearly adverse to those of the shareholders.
10 4 Third, the fact that a majority of the board of directors actively participated in the transaction attacked will excuse demand, 10 5 but the "majority view is that mere passive approval of an allegedly injurious corporate transaction, absent selfinterest or bias by the majority of the board, is insufficient."' 0 6 Fi- (1980) . 101 Comment, supra note 73, at 173 (footnote omitted). One commentator has written that "[g]iven the advantages of the demand requirement and the ease of compliance, the shareholders should be required to make demand in almost every case (footnote omitted)." Id.
102 Rule 23.1 provides that the derivative plaintiff must "allege with particularity" any reasons for failing to make demand. FED. R . 1982) , demand was excused because the directors who had approved of the alleged wrongful transaction were also active participants in a plan to prevent any attempts to obtain control of the corporation in order to entrench themselves in their positions. nally, unequivocal director opposition to the suit will excuse demand.
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In accordance with the general standard, demand is normally excused in section 36(b) suits if a majority of the board of directors is "interested" within the meaning of ICA section 2(a)(19).1 0 8 However, in a section 36(b) suit where a majority of the directors are disinterested, the general standard indicates that the mere fact that these directors have necessarily approved the investment company's advisory compensation schedule is insufficient to excuse demand. Courts have generally held that demand is not excused in cases involving investment companies where the wrongs complained of concerned the company's investment adviser, and where a minority of the directors were affiliated with the adviser and allegedly participated in the wrongful acts while the majority of directors, who were unaffiliated with the adviser, merely ratified them. 109 Any other result presumes that the independent directors deliberately conspired with the affiliated directors to approve the acts that are the subject of the shareholders' complaint. 1 " 0 The directors may, however, conceive of their approval as an error in bus- 1971) . See generally Comment, supra note 73, at 178-80, which explains that demand should still be required in these situations for three reasons. First, acquiescence in the transaction absent self-interest should not "create an irrebuttable presumption that directors would not entertain a claim for relief (footnote omitted)." Demand may refocus directors' fiduciary duties, and give them an opportunity to correct harm that they may have caused. Indeed, they have incentives to take such action in order to avoid a subsequent shareholder suit for the previous wrongdoing. Second, the demand requirement would otherwise be seriously undermined, since directors participate in and probably approve of all major transactions of the corporation. Third, by not requiring demand sham pleading is encouraged, as shareholders will name all the directors as defendants in order to bootstrap themselves into court. 109 Annot., 99 A.L.R.3D 1034, 1036 (1980) . In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), was such a case. There, the court expressly rejected the suggestion that the disinterested directors of a mutual fund were incapable of fairly considering demand after earlier approving of an adviser-fund transaction. Id. at 266-67. "To the extent that [the independent directors] are 'watchdogs' they should be given the opportunity [to respond to demand], not deprived of it." Id. at 267. 110 In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
iness judgment which they would correct "'if . . . asked to do so.' ,,11 Requiring demand therefore would give them the opportunity to exercise that statutorily mandated judgment. 1 2 B. Strengthening Independent Directors "The cornerstone of the ICA's efforts to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds is the requirement that at least 40% of a fund's board be composed of independent outside directors." I s One of Congress' main purposes in enacting the 1970 ICA amendments was to strengthen the role of the disinterested directors and place them "in the role of 'independent watchdogs' . . . who would 'furnish an independent check upon the management' of investment companies.
11 4 Section 36(b) could be read as granting to independent directors only the initial responsibility for negotiating and approving the advisory fee contract, while giving courts the sole responsibility for evaluating advisory fees once a section 36(b) suit has been brought. 5 However, this interpretation conflicts with the congressional intent to give the disinterested directors "primary responsibility" for supplying an "independent check on management" and "for looking after the interests of the funds' shareholders." ' 6 The legislative history of section 36(b) does not specifically address the independent directors' responsibilities when faced with demand. It does indicate that the responsibility placed on the disinterested directors by section 36(b) is broad and far-reaching, extending into the area of the management fees paid by the com- pany. 117 The legislative history makes it clear that section 36(b)
is not intended to authorize a court to substitute its business judgment for that of the mutual fund's board of directors in the area of management fees....
...
A responsible determination regarding the management fee by directors including a majority of the disinterested directors is not to be ignored.
. . .
[T]his section is designed to strengthen the ability of the unaffiliated directors to deal with [management fee] matters [and provide a means whereby the court can enforce the adviser's fiduciary duty]. 18 Directors are generally intelligent and have considerable resources of "'persuasion and publicity"' which they can bring to bear on the adviser. 1 1 9 It would be anomalous to excuse demand automatically and remove all authority from the disinterested directors with respect to section 36(b) suits.
The analysis of demand in the context of the statutory purpose of section 36(b) is not altered by the explicit dicta of Burks v. Lasker, 1 20 which assert that independent directors of investment companies may not terminate a section 36(b) shareholder action under the "business judgment" rule. 121 In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the language of section 36(b)(2) that "approval by the board of directors of such investment company of such compensation [to the adviser]... shall be given such consideration. . . as is deemed appropriate, 1' 22 and on the legislative history of section 36(b), which provides that "the ultimate responsibility for the decision . . . whether the fiduciary duty has 11 SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6-7, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4902-03. If termination is permitted, the issue of this comment is easily resolved, for demand is a necessary antecedent to termination. Even if termination is not permitted in section 36(b) actions,"" however, that conclusion does not necessarily indicate that independent directors cannot respond objectively to demand or that demand should be automatically excused. First, Burks expressly rejected the argument that mutual fund directors are presumed to be too self-interested to terminate section 36(b) suits; if Congress thought them too self-interested, it would not have entrusted those directors with the "critical functions" granted to them under the ICA. 125 Since directors are not presumed to be self-interested, a presumption in favor of excusing demand seems inappropriate.
Second, section 36(b)(2) indicates that a court should give some consideration to "determination by the independent directors as to the propriety of the advisory compensation. ' at 4903. It would be anomalous to place ultimate responsibility on the judiciary for determining whether disinterested directors were successful in preventing excessive fees, while giving the judiciary a passive role once a corporate litigation committee decided to terminate a § 36(b) suit. Note, supra note 7, at 618. Congress was concerned specifically with the recurring problem of mutual fund advisory fees, and it wanted to create a "mechanism by which the fairness of management contracts could be tested in court." SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5, 7 reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4901, 4903. 124 Commentators have debated whether director termination of § 36(b) shareholder actions should be permitted. Compare Case Comment, supra note 1, at 619-26 (directors should not be permitted to terminate, since termination would neutralize § 36(b) suits) with Note, supra note 7, at 733-43 (termination should be permitted, and courts should review only the reasonableness of the board's investigation and its basis for termination). The business judgment termination rule functions as a shareholder protection device by preventing derivative suits where the expected costs of the suit are greater than the expected benefits. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 Ct. (1983 ; cf. Note, supra note 1, at 619-25 (If abused by directors, the termination rule neutralizes the value of a derivative suit.). In any event, the Burks dicta that directors cannot terminate a § 36(b) suit is inconsistent with the emphasis of the rest of that opinion on the "watchdog" good faith and the reasonableness of their judgment in rejecting demand, and a court retaining the authority to review the merits of the directors' judgment. 128 This interpretation of section 36(b)(2) gives the directors great incentive to investigate an excessive advisory fee claim objectively once a demand is made by a shareholder. Moreover, under a demand requirement, neither party is deprived of any right afforded it by section 36(b); directors may still seek to influence the affairs of the corporation through their response to demand, and the courts will have the final say on the resolution of advisory fee issues after demand is made. "While the demand requirement and the termination of derivative suits under the business judgment rule are "inextricably linked," 11 2 because both "stem from the principle that primary responsibility for corporate management lies with the board of directors," 1 0 the two rules involve two separate inquiries, import different legal standards and have different legal consequences. 1 31 The primary purpose of the demand requirement is to exhaust intracorporate remedies prior to bringing suit, thus giving the directors of the corporation the first opportunity to remedy the problem; 1 3 2 the consequence of demand is merely a determination of who will pursue the claim, the corporation or the shareholder.
13 3 In general, only "futility" excuses demand.
13 4 The primary purpose of the "business judgment" termination rule, by contrast, is to permit "' In the normal termination situation, where demand is made and refused by a board of directors, the shareholder has the burden of proving that the directors' decision was wrongful in order for the derivative suit to proceed, Joy v. North, 692 F. 2), however, the directors obviously have the burden of proving the validity of their determination, because a court need not give any weight to that determination. In deciding whether the directors have satisfied their burden, the court might look at data from discovery, and at the committee's investigation and reasoning. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 892. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended that a court consider the merits of whether the investment adviser has committed a breach of fiduciary duty. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6 competent directors, rather than ill-equipped courts, to decide the business-related issue of whether a corporate action should be brought. 13 5 The consequence of this rule is drastic, for a decision by the directors to terminate the suit bars the claim entirely. Because of its different consequences, the demand requirement is more strictly enforced than the termination rule; while only futility excuses demand, courts allow shareholders to sue in the face of a board's decision to terminate whenever the shareholders can show wrongfulness on the part of the directors."' 8 Since derivative suits are important weapons in remedying corporate abuses, it may be desirable in some situations to prevent directors from precluding suit, while at the same time requiring demand to give the directors the chance to remedy the situation efficiently. It is not inconsistent for a court to employ a strict standard with respect to the excusal of demand, but then to refuse to accept a decision by the same board of directors to seek termination of the same action.. . . As some decisions have emphasized, the focus at the demand stage should be on the issue of whether the corporation may take over the suit and either prosecute it or adopt other internal corrective measures, and not on the later question of whether a decision not to sue should be respected by the court. At the demand stage the possibility should not be foreclosed that a demand will induce the board to consider issues and crystallize policies which otherwise might not be given attention (e.g., new accounting controls, revised corporate policy statements or even a change in personnel or remuneration). The demand rule can have efficacy even where the board ultimately rejects the action and the court ultimately permits the plaintiff to sue. Third, the demand requirement inhibits "strike suits" brought by shareholders solely for settlement value. 145 Strike suits are groundless nuisance suits brought "not to benefit but to extort a settlement from the corporation, which wants to avoid the expense and disruption of litigation.'
14 Where a potential recovery in a "settled" strike suit involves a large fee for the attorney and a relatively small recovery for the corporation, a derivative action "may be harmful to shareholders because the costs offset the recovery.' 47 Demand discourages plaintiffs and their attorneys from bringing strike suits. The possibility that, upon receiving demand, the board of directors might take over and prosecute the suit itself, settle with the defendants, or terminate the suit inhibits strike suits. 148 Finally, demand serves several other minor practical functions,' 149 such as notifying the directors of the alleged cause of action and informing the shareholders of directors' refusal to prosecute it. 50 2. Application of the Demand Requirement to Section 36(b) Suits. In determining whether the rule 23.1 demand requirement should be enforced in section 36(b) suits, the essential inquiry is whether, if termination is not permitted, the functions served by demand in the normal derivative suit are furthered by requiring demand in a section 36(b) suit.
a. Increasing Directors' Options. Requiring demand in section 36(b) suits serves the function of allowing the directors to act as managers of the company by giving them the first opportunity to remedy the dispute. Even though they cannot terminate a section 36(b) suit, the directors have a number of options available to them upon receiving demand. First, they may take over the suit and prosecute it themselves; 1 51 should the directors fail to prosecute in good faith, the shareholders can sue the directors for breach of fiduciary duty under section 36(a). 5 the excessive fees or renegotiation of the advisory fee schedule. 15 3 Finally, the directors can refuse demand, in which case the shareholder is still entitled to bring the section 36(b) action, since termination is not permitted. This refusal, however, will allow the directors to express their views on the merits of the action, which views may be given significant weight by the courts under section 36(b)(2). 1 5 b. Promoting Settlements. Requiring demand in section 36(b) actions furthers the policy of exhausting intracorporate remedies prior to bringing derivative suits. The directors may take remedial action, such as a settlement, that renders litigation unnecessary. Settlements of shareholder derivative litigation are favored by the courts in order to avoid the litigation costs 155 of these "notoriously difficult and unpredictable" suits.
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All parties involved in a meritorious section 36(b) action have incentive to reach a legitimate settlement in order to avoid the expense and disruption of complicated litigation. 157 Because no termination is permitted in section 36(b) suits, the demand requirement is likely to promote the chances for a settlement, since demand provides the only opportunity for directors and advisers "to avert a lawsuit through internal corrective measures.' 115, 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982) . One might argue that many of the actions open to an investment company after receivng demand could be taken by the investment company after shareholders brought suit even if demand were not required. This, however, is the case in any derivative suit; nonetheless, demand is nearly always required. A formal demand requirement increases the potential for successful pre-litigation resolution of issues before a complaint is ever filed in federal court.
In general, rule 23.1 requires judicial approval of settlements of derivative suits entered into between plaintiff shareholders and defendants in order to prevent private, collusive settlements in which the plaintiff shareholder and his attorney get the sum paid by the directors in the settlement and the corporation gets nothing." 5 9 Judicial approval is awarded only to settlements that are "fair, reasonable, and adequate."' 6 0 After approval, the settlement has res judicata effect.' 6 ' Since the directors of a corporation are entitled to settle a derivative complaint out of court without judicial approval, 162 however, it is possible that requiring demand in section 36(b) suits could lead to "sham" settlements between the investment company directors and the company's adviser that deprive the plaintiff of his remedy.
Sham settlements are unlikely. When the investment company settles out of court it "acts at its [own] peril. e 16 3 The out-of-court settlement fails to compromise or dismiss the derivative action. . . [and] also leaves the derivative plaintiff free 'to challenge the settlement, either by pursuing the original action and attempting to overthrow the settlement or by bringing a new action against the directors in which the settlement itself is the gravamen of the complaint.' e4 mentation of § 36(b), most suits alleging excessive advisory fees were settled, even though plaintiffs had a very difficult task proving "corporate waste." SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 132-33; see The merits of the original claim and the settlement itself can still be considered by the courts. 16 5 If the shareholders pursue the original section 36(b) claim, the court will review the settlement pleaded by the adviser as a defense. If the shareholders bring a new action against the directors or the advisers of the investment fund under section 36(a), alleging breach of fiduciary duty in negotiating the settlement, the settlement would then be reviewed by the court. If the independent directors are clearly dominated by the adviser or the affiliated directors, the out-of-court settlement can be enjoined."" 6 Although judicial review of out-of-court settlements requires further litigation and hence detracts from the capacity of demand to induce settlements, it does not defeat the purposes of demand in general. Extensive litigation would be required only in the few cases of "sham" settlements made without judicial approval. In most cases, the investment company and the defendant adviser will have a great incentive to obtain judicial approval under rule 23.1167 because court approval can be obtained even over the objection of a shareholder plaintiff, 6 8 and is thereafter res judicata. 1 69 Since directors and advisers will prefer the benefits of a legitimate settlement of a section 36(b) claim, frequent sham settlements and their attendant litigation are unlikely.
c. Deterring Strike Suits. The demand requirement generally serves the practical function of discouraging strike suits by allowing the board of directors to terminate them, subject only to the lenient "business judgment" rule. 170 If termination is not permitted, however, strike suits become a major concern, since the board's incentive to settle even such frivolous actions is strong. 17 The section 36(b) action, "created to benefit the corporation, will produce the opposite, unintended result"' 7 2 if investment companies are unable to rid themselves of meritless and harmful litigation and the corporate fund is drained by settlement payments on frivolous suits.
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Requiring demand, however, helps prevent strike suits even though termination is not permitted. First, even if the independent directors cannot terminate a section 36(b) action, the possibility of removal of the suit from the shareholder's control by the directors taking over prosecution or settling the claim will discourage the initiation of strike suits.
, Second, the section 36(b)(2) provision that "approval by the board of directors. . .of such compensation • . . shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances' ' 7 5 suggests that courts should give considerable weight at the summary judgment stage to the opinions of disinterested directors made in good faith after a reasonable investigation of the shareholders' demand. 17 Thus, the
